Monday, 22 November 2010
First Remembrance Sunday, Now the X-Factor: Heroes or Villains?
Last night's X-Factor, which is rather eagerly followed in my house (but more significantly in millions of homes across the UK, possibly elsewhere too, and across the generations), featured the performance and release of a song by all 16 finallists from the show, a new version of David Bowie's "Heroes". It was called "Heroes" when released in the mid-1970s: the inverted commas meant to convey a sense of irony or ambiguity about the idea of heroes, perhaps the notion that one person's hero might well be someone else's villain.
In addition to the X-Factor song performance, during which a number of men and women in military uniform, presumably still serving in the armed forces, appeared on stage, there was a brief report on the crippling injuries sustained in a bomb attack by one young soldier while on "routine patrol" in Afghanistan. The injured soldier came from a military family - his father had been killed in Ulster.
According to the soldiers who had written to The Guardian, the Poppy appeal had "subverted" Armistice Day - a "day that should be about peace and remembrance" - and had converted it "into a month-long drum roll of support for current wars.... The true horror and futility of war is forgotten and ignored." They also noted that the poppy had been promoted as a symbol of support of "our Heroes", arguing that "There is nothing heroic about being blown up in a vehicle. There is nothing heroic about fighting in an unnecessary conflict."
Last night's X-Factor, I think, falls broadly into line with the sentiment expressed above. It was hard not to feel sympathy for a young soldier wounded in action, especially as his tearful mother was shown expressing horror at the news of her son's wounding. But the more political sentiment was also significant: there was no suggestion or hint, so far as I could tell, that the war in Afghanistan might be problematic in any way, nor that the number of Afghans killed and injured runs into hundreds of thousands, and that this war has gone on too long and should now end. There was just an understandable expression of sympathy for the injured soldier who, it was clearly stated, sustained his injury in the service of "his country" - which was not questioned at all.
"My country right or wrong," conveys the sentiment. Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori - words used by Wilfred Owen in his world war one: It is sweet and seemly to die for one's country, no matter the cause.
In addition, the soldier showed and expressed considerable courage in getting his life back together and seemed to be unrepentant about anything he or the British army might have done or be doing in Afghanistan. He resolved to go forward with his life - no looking back.
That resolve is precisely that urged by the current goverment in regard to Afghanistan - keep going. It is what Tony Blair argues over and over again in his unrepentant memoir, A Journey.
Is someone a "hero" just for fighting or dying in the military, regardless of the cause for which they fight? Why isn't the British state looking after these young men and women? After all, they sent them out there in the first place? Why is left to a charity? Why do they use a mass entertainment programme for what is a political/military cause?
I have no problem feeling sympathy for someone injured in a war. I have no problem in charitable organisations rasing funds for such causes. My problem lies with why the British state does not look after those who risk life and limb.
I have a problem with the misuse of a mass entertainment programme that unquestioningly, and probably unwittingly, promotes an unjust war. While David Bowie and Brian Eno, who wrote the song, had a sense of irony about heroism, the X-Factor betrays no such subtleties.
Saturday, 20 November 2010
$1.21 Trillion: US Spending on the War on Terror
Iraq: £751 billion
Afghanistan: $336 billion
Unallocated thus far: $6 billion
The sums above include funds to bribe local militias into joining US forces in fighting insurgents, though the precise sums are unspecified. Most of the spending is incurred by the Department of Defense and represents funding over and above its normal peacetime budget.
With 94% of the budget allocated to DoD, and just 5% to the Department of State/USAID (the Agency for International Development), the answer to the question asked with greater frequency nowadays - "whatever happened to American "soft power"? - is that it just doesn't apply anymore.
Such large-scale spending over time will impact, indeed has impacted, on America's relative power, just as it did during the Vietnam War. In that case, the Japanese, South Korean and Taiwanese economies boomed as war production contracts poured in; in addition those economies began producing consumer durables which the war-oriented US economy could no longer manufacture.
And when it comes to America's problems at home, look no further than California today:
An Economy on Life Support
The depth of the crisis faced by California screams out from the cold hard data. Over one in five Californians are unemployed, underemployed, or have simply given up searching for work. Nearly another one in five lives in poverty. Low-income workers fortunate to have a job have seen their wages decline since 2006 – with middle income worker salaries remaining stagnant. 8.2 million Californians – up from 6.4 million in 2007 – lack health coverage.
Doors will slam shut this year on as many as 35,000 applicants to the California State University system. Both university systems approved 20% tuition and fee hikes since the start of 2009 – and UC Regents has just approved an additional 30% hike this year – ending too many students dreams of a higher education, and burdening too many more with high interest debt.
The news for educators is no better. More than 23,000 teachers recently received “pink slips”, unlikely to return to the classroom next fall.
Over three-quarters of a million California families were ousted from their homes in 2008 and 2009. The Center for Responsible Lending projects another 2 million foreclosures through 2012 – with nearby homes losing an average of over $50,000 in value. 2.4 million California borrowers – 35 percent of all properties with a mortgage – are currently under water (e.g. owe more on their home than it’s currently worth). By 2011, that number will increase to nearly 70 percent of homeowners.
California could use an economic stimulus package. Can America afford to spend over one trillion dollars on war when their own country is screaming for public investment?
Lifted Lines and Lacks Vision: Cameron's Guildhall Speech on Britain's Global Role
"We have the resources - commercial, military and cultural - to remain a major player in the world. We have the relationships - with the most established powers and the fastest-growing nations - that will benefit our economy. And we have the values - national values that swept slavery from the seas, that stood up to both fascism and communism and that helped to spread democracy and human rights around the planet - that will drive us to do good around the world."
So spoke David Cameron at Guildhall last week. Britain is strong, capable, and a Force for Good in the World.
Those lines owe their origins not to Gordon Brown, or Tony Blair, or Margaret Thatcher - their provenance reaches back into British history - an imperial mentality forged over generations. Lord Palmerston said it in the 1860s; George Canning said it even earlier; Gladstone and Disraeli said it in their own ways in the 1870s and 1880s; the Foreign Office's Eyre Crowe sort of said it in 1907; Clement Attlee said it over and over after 1945, showing that 'de-colonisation' need not interfere with imperialism.
As Cameron acknowledged in his speech, Britain has "a glorious past" of "deep engagement around the world", an imperial "instinct to be self-confident and active well beyond our shores"; it's "in our DNA", no less.
No mention of "empire" of course when he talks about India, and China, and Korea, and Zambia, but "deep engagement" or "centuries-long engagement" which has "left a rich legacy". No mention of the rich legacy Britain left in Afghanistan in the imperial era, or the legacy it is organising there now in that tragic country, with hundreds of thousands dead in their wake.
Britain's national interests appear to focus on big business, as strong a military as Britain can afford (to assist its flexible approach to "threats" through "Brigade-diplomacy"), and the deployment of foreign aid more closely tied to building security and stability. Cameron does not aspire to a "perfect democracy" in Afghanistan, just a place from which "al Qaeda can never again pose a threat to us". The "us" means "US", I think, as 9-11 occurred on US soil.
And the United States remains not just "special" but "crucial" to Cameron's Britain - through G8, G20, NATO, intelligence cooperation, counter-terrorism, and the like. An attack on the US is an attack on "us" - a quiet assumption that has run through British foreign policy since the 1940s and shows no signs of abating.
Cameron's lines have been lifted from past prime ministers' Guildhall speeches; there is a Vision. It just isn't very inspiring for anyone with a sense of history, especially a sense of western interventions in the 'third world'. We have been here before. When will British elites learn that it is possible to be global in outlook, to see the interconnectedness of things, but realise that imperial interventions - for whatever purposes, usually prestige, power, or material gain - are totally counter-productive? Just look at Iraq and Afghanistan.
But what can you do about imperial DNA?
Friday, 5 November 2010
"The Special Relationship? Built to Last": Nick Clegg
The UK's [recently-published] National Security Strategy recognises that Britain cannot go it
alone in the world. British troops have only operated independently twice in the past 30 years
- in Sierra Leone (2000) and in the Falklands (1982). The bulk of UK military activity has been
undertaken in co-operation with allies. There is much talk in the NSS of partnership, therefore,
both within NATO and the EU, as well as a new emphasis on stronger bilateral relations with India, China and other emerging powers. But one thing is abundantly clear: the ‘special relationship’ with the United States remains fundamental. As the NSS document says, “our strong defence, security and intelligence relationship with the US is exceptionally close and central to our national interest”. Critics may argue that it was subservience to Pentagon paranoia that got Britain into the quagmires of Iraq and Afghanistan (and may yet again draw Britain into a future foreign crisis). Many were hoping for UK leaders to end their 'slavish' devotion to Washington – the words of the current Deputy Prime Minister during the general election (although now he praises a 'built to last' relationship with the United States).
Earlier in the year, the UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee reported that "the perception that the British government was a subservient 'poodle' to the US administration leading up to the period of the invasion of Iraq and its aftermath is widespread both among the British public and overseas". And the Committee concluded that "this perception, whatever its relation to reality, is deeply damaging to the reputation and interests of the UK". The sight of British Ministers scrambling to provide reassurance to Washington that the defence cuts were less deep or wide-ranging than the Pentagon and White House initially feared only reinforces that perception.
It is also unlikely that the landmark Anglo-French defence cooperation treaty announced on 2 November represents a strategic realignment away from Washington towards Paris (and certainly not to the EU-side of Brussels). Rather, as the Prime Minister pointed out, this represents a "practical, hard-headed agreement between two sovereign countries". It is also interesting to note that David Cameron needed to stress that the treaties would not weaken British sovereignty and did not amount to a sharing of the UK's ‘independent
nuclear deterrent’ (which, ironically, would have required permission from Washington).
In essence, behind the preamble about shared strategic perspectives and common adversaries, the pressing reality is that both countries want to retain their global reach, but neither can afford to do so in isolation.
Tuesday, 2 November 2010
Anglo-French Union, Again?
An Anglo-French military treaty, due to be signed today, has been greeted with dismay in some quarters while indicating to others that the Anglo-American 'special relationship' may well be slipping away. Is this a turning point? I'm not sure. If it is, is it an unalloyed advance? Is Britain less likely to try and police the world, just behind the American behemoth, if the French are close to hand, whispering restraint in Britain's ear? Would an Ango-French military alliance have opposed the Iraq War or would it have forced France to support it (or would the matter have split apart such a union)?
The historical precedents are there to consider: in June 1940, when France was on the verge of signing an armistice with Nazi Germany, Britain offered to France the prospect of an Anglo-French Union - one nation with a common currency, passports, and the like. But the French cabinet rejected it, much to PM Winston Churchill's relief (he hadn't been too keen in the first place), and the French headed to a kind of European union headed by Adolf Hitler, against which many Frenchmen and women fought valiantly, a valuable aid to Anglo-American efforts. Britain, of course, went on to forge an Anglo-American alliance that holds to this day.
In 1956, the-then French prime minister, Guy Mollet, proposed a union of France and Britain as they cunningly manoeuvered in the Suez 'crisis'. Egypt's President Nasser, you will recall, had had the temerity to take control of the Suez Canal, which was on his sovereign territory, much to the chagrin of Britain and France - who still entertained ideas about gunboat diplomacy to 'sort out' such people and put them in their place. Clearly, their ideas about de-colonisation did not fundamentally impoverish their imperial mentalities.
Prime Minister Anthony Eden, perhaps sensing that the Suez adventure was about to go awry, declined the French offer. He also wanted to ensure that Britain, whose ambitions remained global in scope, would not get too tied down in Europe. France, which was very keen to unify Europe as a way of controlling Germany, then signed the Treaty of Rome and, a decade or so later, withdrew from NATO's military command structure (which it re-entered only last year). France then blocked Britain's attempts to enter the European Community for almost twenty years, declaring the Anglo-Saxons to be bent on global domination, especially in the Vietnam War era, when said Anglo-Saxons were fighting a war in a former French colony.
Is a post-Iraq War, post-Blair-Brown, Britain ready to embrace Europe, tame its global mentality, eschew further American adventures, and stop punching above its weight in world affairs? Will PM David Cameron, current leader of Churchill's party, sign the death warrant of British imperial mentalities?
The severe financial crisis, which is driving the current phase of national security policy suggests that this is no permanent retreat from imperial thinking, merely a practical, pragmatic response to a crisis.
American power continues to align with every cultural, imperial and ethno-racial instinct of Cameron's party, never mind the political influence of Tory Euro-sceptics. But times are hard. You have to 'make do' with what you can.
Even within these parameters, however, there remains the notion of a certain degree of freedom within an Anglo-French alliance - room for manoeuvre, should a tempting offer from across the Atlantic come Britain's way. The other point is that the new treaty is being sold as an opportunity for joint Anglo-French military intervention in Africa, where they share 'common interests'.
Their forms might change, but imperial mentalities do not die easily.
Friday, 8 October 2010
American Expansionism Explored
On 5th October 2010, Philip S Golub spoke at IDEAS to launch his new book, 'Power, Profit and Prestige: A History of American Expansionism'. Here he sets out the core rationale behind his argument for the emergence of an 'imperial cosmology' among American leaders.
In the 1990s, after decades of hand wringing over American “decline”, influential parts of the US power elite began dreaming of a new “American Century” and an expanded “American peace”. This was a broad ideational trend, encompassing nationalist and internationalist segments of the foreign policy and security establishment who, notwithstanding varying prescriptions regarding world order, interpreted the end of the Cold War as an historic opportunity to reassert and expand US power and authority. By the end of the decade the main strands of elite opinion, casually comparing the US to Rome at its height, were celebrating the US’ “unparalleled ascendancy around the globe...unrivalled by even the greatest empires of the past” (Henry Kissinger).
Imperial imaginings were particularly pronounced in the national security complex and the neo-conservative right, which harboured extravagant visions of “global empire” and lasting strategic monopoly. At the turn of the century, imperial outlooks pervaded a new administration that sought, in Condoleezza Rice’s words, to “capitalize on [the opportunities offered] by the shifting of the tectonic plates in international politics” and establish a new world order under exclusive US authority. Striving for unbounded autonomy, the Bush administration launched a methodical assault on the UN system, abandoned international law, and initiated a new phase of military mobilization and imperial expansion in Central Asia and the Gulf. The unintended but predictable result of this effort to curb pluralism was a severe erosion of US political legitimacy and an accentuation of the systemic movement towards polycentrism that it was intended to inhibit.
Power, Profit and Prestige aims to make sense of this turbulent phase of world politics and assess its consequences by situating contemporary change in historic and comparative perspective. Rejecting lazy explanations that dismiss US monopoly-seeking behaviour as an aberration or a “mistake”, and contesting structural realist assumptions that it was simply induced by the power maximising mechanics of international anarchy, the book argues in favour of a historical sociological approach that studies state formation and collective identity construction in the longue durĂ©e.
Excavating an imperial past that never passed, it weaves together the material and ideational dimensions of the long US expansionary experience and shows how the post-Cold War imperial urge, the conditions of possibility of which were created by the new power asymmetry, can be traced back to a causa remota: a pervasive culture of expansion and force, rooted in deep currents of late-modern transatlantic imperial history. The book thus highlights the remarkable kinship between the worldviews of late nineteenth century expansionists and those of their successors who presided over the post-1945 American Pax. It argues that this continuity reflects an underlying imperial cosmology, which US elites shared with their European counterparts, that emerged in the late modern period about the ordering of the world, cultural hierarchy, and the destiny of the West to be at the centre and the apex.
Like late nineteenth century expansionists who imagined American world-empire as destiny, since the 1940s US leaders have conceived of Pax Americana as the natural and necessary outcome of a historical process of imperial selection and succession. Notwithstanding changing international and domestic circumstances, foundational assumptions regarding the US’ world historical role and international hierarchy have varied only slightly from one period and one administration to another. With very few exceptions, leaders have perceived the US as the necessary centre of the cosmos, with other nations and societies in orbit around it.
New leaders, however liberal and democratic in outlook are constrained by the US’ logic of world power and its structures of reproduction. Even if he so wished, Barack Obama cannot erase the past or simply decide to liquidate the imperial system that he has inherited and will briefly preside over. Like many of his predecessors, he is caught in the same bind as reformist British Liberal and Labour leaders in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries who found, once in power, in Elisabeth Monroe’s words, that “a worldwide empire...cannot change direction overnight”. Looking to the future, Power, Profit and Prestige argues that the US will nonetheless have to come to terms with the fact that globalisation has shifted the world’s tectonic plates in unforeseen ways and that the western era of dominance is now slowly coming to an end.
Philip S. Golub is a widely published author and Contributing Editor of Le Monde Diplomatique. He teaches International Relations and International Political Economy at the Institut d'etudes europeennes, Universite Paris 8 and at the American University of Paris (AUP).
Friday, 1 October 2010
Disaster in Afghanistan
This article appeared in the excellent NATO WATCH Observatory, October 2010: it clarifies matters in regard to Afghanistan today and places in context the statements being made by President Obama, Premier Cameron, and General Petraeus. It is reproduced in full below:
NATO Watch Editorial:
Blowing security bubbles in
By Ian Davis and Ben Thomas
When British forces handed over control of Sangin
"security bubbles".
Under the security-bubble strategy, troops are
However, such announcements
At the heart of the problem is the lack of any real
reduced to a peripheral entity (at least in
NATO forces seem to have become stuck in a
Essentially all that appears to be left is the search
This, then, is the dilemma that faces military
the audience that if NATOtroops could improve the security situation in Kandahar whilst building local services and
governance capacity then over time the Afghan people’s confidence in government might gradually be restored.
Like General Petraeus, the British commander was essentially placing the NATO effort in Afghanistan in the same context as the US surge in Iraq. While force in Iraq did bring a temporary halt to the deadly sectarian violence that was threatening to engulf the country in civil war, and as such could be regarded as a qualified success,
it did so mostly because of a confluence of factors: Muqtada al-Sadr’s unilateral ceasefire, the American-sponsored ‘Sunni awakening’ as well as the military surge (and perhaps also the rather inconvenient truth that much of the country had in reality been 'ethnically cleansed' by the time the surge was fully underway). In Afghanistan, however, the coalition is battling an insurgency drawn almost entirely from Pashtuns, the country's largest and traditionally
dominant ethnic group. In addition, rampant levels of corruption, weak governmental structures and the fragmented nature of Afghan society (especially increasing tension between the Pashtuns and the smaller Tajik, Uzbek and
Hazara ethnic groups) make it unlikely that any successful military campaign would be accompanied by the sort of political improvements that were trumpeted in Iraq. What is perhaps hoped for, but largely left unsaid, is that NATO will leave behind an Afghan security force competent enough to strong-arm enough of the country to maintain a relatively stable order into the near future (or at least until the next US and British election cycle). So the reality is that
NATO troops are being sacrificed for short-term political expediency in Western capitals and the creation of a corrupt
and authoritarian regime of questionable efficiency in Kabul.
Indeed, the evidence strongly suggests that the NATO presence in Afghanistan is itself acting as a radicalising process for young Islamic militants, and rather than ‘making Britons safer’ the mission is actually making them less so. Indeed, even General Petraeus attributes the rise in violence in the past two years in Afghanistan in part to the massive spike in allied forces. "I can trace the line of the violence, right along the security bubble," Gen. Petraeus said. "When we have an operation going on, people shoot back from their sanctuaries and safe havens", he added. Well, there’s a surprise, the blighters have the audacity to shoot back! The National Army Museum in London currently has an exhibition entitled ‘The Road to Kabul: British Armies in Afghanistan, 1838–1919’. The
advertising poster, in an uncanny echo to modern times, quotes Field Marshal Frederick Roberts, one of the most successful commanders of the Victorian era, as saying (in 1880): I feel sure I am right when I say that the less
the Afghans see of us, the less they will dislike us.
The current strategy rests on the hope that NATO forces can batter the Taliban to the negotiating table. And while Maj. Gen. Carter was adamant that the initiative had swung back in favour of NATO forces in Kandahar, without further political progress military action is only likely to provide limited and short-term success. In the meantime politicians back home continue to give their citizens platitudes that have long ceased to be relevant and NATO troops and Afghan civilians continue to die for an unpalatable but ‘necessary’ end state.
A recent report by the US-based Afghanistan Study Group claims that “US interests at stake in Afghanistan do not warrant this level of sacrifice” and that “prospects for success are dim”. It is hard to disagree with that conclusion as well as the report’s main recommendation: the need for a “new way forward” based on reconciliation among the warring parties, economic development, and region-wide diplomatic engagement. The real tragedy of the conflict is that none of the options left open are very appealing and any outcome is likely to be riddled with uncomfortable compromises. However, while the focus remains on expanding security bubbles, the prospects for a comprehensive peace settlement in Afghanistan continue to fade and die.
Ian Davis is director of NATO Watch and
Ben Thomas is a post-graduate student at
Kings College, London