The world is getting restless with some states’ attachment to nuclear
weapons. So why is Britain going out of its way to deepen its nuclear
relationship with the United States?
The small community of observers who watch Britain’s
quiet moves to extend its nuclear lifeline with the United States have just been rewarded–the ten-year
renewal and modification of the
US-
UK nuclear Mutual Defence Agreement (
MDA)
to be debated in Parliament next Thursday. Critics claim the
arrangement stretches and breaks Britain’s legal commitments under the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (
NPT) and ensures Britain remains dependent upon America for both its nuclear arsenal and foreign policy direction.
But
it goes deeper than that: Britain and other governments face a choice.
In an age of climate change, resource scarcity and other global
inter-dependencies, the chances of successful adaptation of human
societies to these stresses depends upon governments cooperating more
effectively within multilateral frameworks. Privileged arrangements like
the
MDA that undermine this approach must be swept away.
The
MDA governs cooperation in matters related to nuclear weapons between the United States and the
UK.
The two states share Trident missiles from a common pool, technologies
associated with the design and development of nuclear warheads, and
critical parts of the huge ‘boomer’ submarines that carry the missiles
and warheads. For example, despite different requirements that mean the
UK
will have to fill four missile tubes with concrete ballast or use them
for different purposes, both versions of the new follow-on submarines
will have a common missile compartment with twelve missile tubes,
command and control facilities and crew quarters.
The Nuclear Information Service
points out that this particular update to the
MDA also opens the door to far more extensive cooperation on nuclear naval propulsion technology in particular. The
PWR3 nuclear reactors in
UK
Trident successor submarines will use next generation American naval
nuclear propulsion technology. Though not governed by any particular
treaty, navies tend to protect their nuclear propulsion technology as
closely as states guard their nuclear weapon designs. It is a highly
sensitive aspect of the cat and mouse games that makes up anti-submarine
warfare. The fact that the Americans are willing to share so much of
their most prized secrets is an indication of the unique relationship,
and gives a clue to one of the core reasons why the British elite are so
attached to the
MDA arrangements.
From a technical perspective, the modification and renewal of the
MDA
makes every sense. Both countries deploy the same Trident missile
submarine system and use identical components. Cooperation on the next
generation of technology saves money, results in better systems and
cements the relationship between the two countries. Anyone that believes
in a strong relationship between the two countries (and that includes
almost everyone in the British political elite) must surely agree that
if both countries are to field nuclear weapons, it makes sense to share
information and technology.
What’s more, the amendments to the
MDA also introduce important new dimensions to
US-
UK
teamwork in the field of nuclear counter-proliferation and intelligence
sharing. Surely this can only be a good thing? In sum, the two
countries justify cooperation in the development of technologies we
would rather live without as necessity to hold the line and prevent
their enemies from developing their own weapons capabilities.
But this ‘better us than them’ mentality fails to acknowledge the bigger picture.
There are 184 non-nuclear weapon state members of the
NPT
who have foresworn nuclear weapons in their own national security
strategies on the basis that global security is secured by mutual
restraint. The five recognized nuclear weapon states have also
acknowledged this by promising to negotiate away their own arsenals at
an early date. This is a question of legal obligation.
BASIC received a formal legal opinion from Rabinder Singh
QC and Professor Christine Chinkin of Matrix Chambers back in 2004 suggesting the
MDA runs counter to our
NPT Article
VI obligation to engage in nuclear disarmament negotiations.
But
more than this, it’s a question of confidence in the future and
commitment to global multilateral arrangements. These matter far more to
our future than protecting military arrangements that deeply undermine
the capacity for multilateralism.
Other states exercise
self-restraint as non-nuclear weapon states and appear to thrive without
suffering nuclear blackmail. It is not as if nuclear weapons are beyond
their reach technically. One state that displays no such self-restraint
is North Korea, one of the poorest countries on the planet.
Claims this week from the
US
Commander of Forces in South Korea that North Korea has developed a
nuclear warhead that can fit on top of its missiles may be premature,
but no one should doubt they are well on the way to having a significant
nuclear deterrent.
But most still choose not to have nuclear weapons. True, some in
NATO
believe they depend upon extended nuclear deterrence, but abstain from
pursuing their own nuclear deterrent). States without such a
relationship survive in turbulent regions, and actively choose
non-nuclear security arrangements. They recognize they are safer if they
and their neighbours find other ways of settling their disputes and
achieving stability without nuclear deterrence.
Nevertheless,
non-nuclear weapon states are increasingly restless over the continued
attachment to national nuclear arsenals within a handful of states. They
believe this not only threatens nuclear war, but also deeply harms
long-term confidence in the
NPT and other
non-proliferation initiatives. Sustainable confidence requires stronger
non-proliferation instruments and genuine nuclear disarmament–a movement
towards universal non-discriminatory membership. Britain’s renewal of
its nuclear arsenal, despite not being in direct strategic competition
with any other state and being within the
NATO alliance, is particularly corrosive to confidence.
So
why, if we are so close to the United States, should Britain choose to
spend a third its defence equipment budget over the next 15 years on
Trident? This is a system with dubious military utility that essentially
doubles up on the
US umbrella our other allies seem content to depend upon.
It
could be because Trident pulls the Americans in close and gives us a
unique status in relationship to them. But this goes both ways. It also
cements British dependency on the United States, and by extension
commits the
UK to a policy of maintaining
US
hegemony and exceptionalism. These are the very values that undermine
the global multilateral systems we will increasingly rely upon for our
real national and global security as global challenges of climate change
and resource competition really bite –systems we claim to support.
We
don’t like it when North Korea pursues their own nuclear weapons
capability, or any suggestion that they are supplying Syria or Iran with
nuclear or missile technology triggers strong reactions (and illegal
‘preventive’ military strikes from Israel). Yet the British government
quietly renews the
MDA with minimal fuss and
no question of Parliament having a vote on the matter. Once complete,
officials can get on with trading far more sophisticated and potent
weapon systems the North Koreans can only dream about.
It is time
we joined up our thinking: the worlds of nuclear deterrence, defence and
alliance need to meet those of nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation
and fair global governance. For too long these communities have been
kept apart, and the deterrence discussion has been pre-eminent in the
thinking of national leaderships because of a self-fulfilling lack of
confidence in multilateral arrangements.
The annual First Committee of the
UN
General Assembly responsible for multilateral disarmament negotiations,
in session in New York this month, is just approaching its finale–a
series of resolutions on ideas to develop and strengthen multilateral
regimes. It is a precursor to the month-long
NPT
Review Conference next May that coincides with the British General
Election, the first in a generation that precedes the final decision on
whether we renew our only nuclear weapons system.
With business as
usual in Whitehall’s Ministry of Defence, and deeper nuclear weapon
relationships developing between the British and American shipbuilders,
weapons designers and navies, is there really any hope of a new dawn for
the non-proliferation regime?
